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ABSTRACT 
 
CURRENCY CRISES THEORY: THIRD GENERATION MODELS 
 
Koç, Emre 
M.S., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Taner Yiğit 
 
August 2009 
 
 
This thesis investigates third generation currency crisis literature and 
concludes that the 2001 Turkish currency crisis can be labeled as a third 
generation type crisis, despite having unique characteristics. According to the 
model of Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) which derives risk premium of the 
economy from the balance sheet structure of the corporate sector, higher 
domestic debt increases the probability of currency crisis, whereas higher 
foreign debt can either increase or decrease the probability of a currency crisis 
depending on the parameter values. This model has little explanatory power for 
the 2001 crisis, since the crisis predominantly arise from the maturity mismatch 
problem in the balance sheet of the financial sector, coupled with moral hazard 
problem driven by implicit government guarantees. In addition to these two 
issues which are examined by different strands of third generation currency 
crisis literature, Turkish crisis display distinctive characteristics such as  the role 
of fragile fiscal deficit financing mechanism.     
 
Keywords: Third Generation Currency Crisis Models, Implicit Government 
Guaranties, Moral Hazard, Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities               
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ÖZET 
 
PARA KRİZİ TEORİSİ: ÜÇÜNCÜ NESİL MODELLER 
Koç, Emre 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Taner Yiğit 
 
Ağustos 2009 
 
Bu tezde üçüncü nesil para krizi literatür  incelenmiş, kendine özgü özellikleri 
bulunmasına rağmen 2001 Türkiye krizinin üçüncü nesil tipi kriz olarak 
nitelendirilebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır. İktisadi riskin firma bilanço yapısından 
türetildiği Eijffinger ve Goderis (2007) modelinde, yüksek iç borcun para krizi 
olasılığını artırıken, yüksek dış borcun parametre değerlerine göre para krizini 
olasılığını artırması da azaltması da mümkündür. Kriz ağırlıklı olarak, finansal sektörün 
bilançolarındaki vade uyuşmazlığı ile beraber dolaylı hükümet güvencesinden doğan 
ahlaki tehlikeden kaynaklandığından,  bu modelin 2001 krizini açıklama gücü düşüktür.  
Üçüncü nesil para krizi modellerinin değişik kolları tarafından incelelenen bu iki 
konunun yanısıra, Türkiye krizi, kırılgan mali açık finansman mekanizmasının rolü gibi 
kendine özgü özellikler sergilemektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Üçüncü Nesil Para Krizi Modelleri, Dolaylı Hükümet 
Güvenceleri, Ahlaki Tehlike, Bilanço Kırılganlığı 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
A currency crisis can be defined through quantitative measures of depreciation 
such as: “a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 25 per cent that is 
also at least a 10 per cent increase in the rate of depreciation”. (Frankel and 
Rose, 1996) Other papers describe the term in a broader sense, as a specified 
amount of change in Market Pressure Index: (Saxena and Wong, 1999)  
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where e denotes the bilateral exchange rate of country “i” with Germany or US, 
i is the nominal interest rate in country i, r refers to non-gold international 
reserves that the central bank has and the changes in exchange rate, interest rate 
and reserves are scaled by their respective standard deviations. A high value of 
the index indicates high level of pressure on the domestic currency. The logic is 
that, if there is an attack on currency, either exchange rate will depreciate, 
interest rates will be increased as a defensive measure or the monetary authority 
will sell foreign currency to preserve the value of domestic currency.  The index 
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is primarily used to capture currency crisis risk or identify episodes of currency 
crisis in flexible exchange rate regimes. More relevant to our discussion is the 
currency crisis definition of Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) which is “the 
situations in which the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the cost 
of abandonment” Over the last 30 years, numerous countries have come under 
pressure or experienced currency crisis at different points in time.1 Doing a 
catch-up work, economists have been trying to address symptoms and remedies 
after the occurrences of currency crisis. The models can be grouped into three 
generations each of which intends to clarify different notions that pave the path 
to currency crisis.  
 The thesis is organized in three parts. In part I, the conditions which gave 
rise to emergence of third generation literature are briefly examined. Part II 
summarizes early third generation studies, focusing primarily on Corsetti (1999) 
and Krugman (1998a). The paper titled “Currency Crisis, Monetary Policy and 
Corporate Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities” by Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) 
constitutes the core of this study and is examined in Part III. Part IV relates the 
third generation currency crises literature to the 2001 currency crisis in Turkey. 
Finally, Part IV concludes the thesis.  
                                                        
1
 Mexico in 1976, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Mexico in the early and mid-80s, Chile and 
Argentina in 1980s, European Monetary System in 1992, Mexico in 1995, major part of Asia in 
1997 and 1998, Turkey in 2001, Argentina in 2001 and 2002. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
RELATED STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. The Need for Third Generation Model 
 
Earlier studies of Salant and Henderson (1976), Krugman (1979), and Flood and 
Garber (1984), which are called the first-generation models, thoroughly identify 
the relationship between persistent government deficits on capital outflows and 
currency crisis. Later, the crisis in Chile and Argentina in the 1980s and 
European Monetary System in 1992 led to the development of next generation 
of models, which stresses the existence of multiple equilibrium in foreign 
exchange markets and possibility of self fulfilling crisis. Although, first and 
second generation currency crisis models have been successful in explaining 
former episodes of currency crisis, they could not assist researchers in predicting 
the East Asia crisis (1997-1998)  Before the crisis, some pessimists have 
expressed their worries regarding East Asian miracle, as these economies were 
running substantial current account deficits.  
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However, the actual downturn was more complex and drastic than the most 
negative-minded prediction, involving collapses in domestic asset markets, bank 
failures and widespread bankruptcies in the real economy. (Krugman 1998a)   
The East Asian crisis exhibits some characteristics which were either not present 
or observable in previous episodes of crisis. First, the crisis countries had 
responsible fiscal policies, low budget deficits or surpluses and sound economic 
fundamentals which make first generation models inapplicable. Furthermore, 
these economies were not facing any exchange rate stability – unemployment 
trade off and had been growing at impressive rates for a long period of time. 
Before the crisis, they were widely regarded as the ideal model of growth for the 
developing world. (Saxena and Wong 1999)2 
 
2.2. Early Third Generation Models 
The earliest models to address shortcomings of the previous generations include 
Krugman (1998 a,b) and Corsetti, et al (1998,1999) which proposed moral 
hazard as a possible explanation for the ongoing Asian crisis. The two authors 
analyzed financial and currency crises as interrelated phenomena and defined 
moral hazard as the common factor underlying the twin crisis. At the core of 
their analysis the authors assume that, counting on future bailout interventions, 
                                                        
2
 Despite their sound macroeconomic outlook, it is worth noting that East Asian economies has 
experienced institutional weaknesses prior to the crisis. These weaknesses can be regarded as 
potential triggers of the crisis 1997. Appendix A displays the significant increase in fraud cases 
in 1998 for Thailand and Republic of Korea. This jump is followed by a relatively steady pattern 
in these two crisis countries. However, in Hong Kong and Malaysia the total number of 
fraudulent activities does not appear to be linked to the economic crisis. 
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the weakly regulated financial institutions engage in risky investment. By 
definition, a bailout intervention is of fiscal nature, altering distribution of 
income between taxpayers and financial intermediaries. Within this context the 
government’s burden of financial insurance take an implicit form, which is not 
observable until the crisis arises. Although the liabilities remain manageable in 
the presence of the mild sector-specific shocks, the financial fragility becomes 
observable in periods of sizable macroeconomic shocks. Within this framework, 
the currency side of the financial crisis stems from the anticipated fiscal cost of 
recapitalization which also generates expectations of deficit monetization of 
future fiscal deficit and consecutive slowdown of the economy due to structural 
adjustment. (Corsetti 1999) Corsetti`s line of argument implies that expectations 
of a future bailout need not be linked to any explicit guarantee or policy of the 
government. Even in the absence of a public insurance scheme, rational 
domestic and foreign agents anticipate intervention, which was the case in the 
East Asian crisis. That is to say, no ex-ante announcement by policy makers is 
capable of convincing the agents that, ex-post government will remain 
committed to laissez-faire arguments and let financial system to advance 
towards its debacle.     
Corsetti explains transition from the moral hazard problem to continuous 
overinvestment by the process of evergreening. Corsetti characterizes an 
economy where the technology parameter of the aggregate production function 
is stochastic. 
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Y denotes output, K is physical capital, L is labor, A~  is a technology parameter, 
and σ is the stochastic component of technology. Being insured against adverse 
contingencies, the producers have no incentive to incur a loss at times of a 
negative shock. Instead the producers choose to re-finance the decrease in 
earning through external borrowing which leads to a higher level of capital as 
compared to the efficient level. In Krugman’s terminology the condition 
corresponds to “overinvestment, driven by Pangloss values” which is described 
later on.  As a negative shock to profitability ( σ−= AAt
~
) is not offset by 
contemporaneous government transfer, the agents resort to further foreign 
borrowing and this process is called evergreening. Theoretically, even when the 
government budget is balanced, through evergreening an economy can 
experience persistent current account deficits. Evidently, evergreening has 
natural limitations. If the process leads to persistent current account deficits, the 
stock of external liabilities would grow faster than the cost of debt, eventually 
the solvency constraint will be violated and international lenders will not be 
lending at market rate r. 
As Krugman suggests, the aforementioned implicit government 
guarantee gives rise to risky investment of financial intermediaries, which in 
turn pose inflationary pressures exclusively in the asset markets.  Overpricing of 
the assets was partly sustained through a circular process where the increased 
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asset prices induced by risky lending provided a sounder outlook on behalf of 
financial intermediaries. After the crisis, the mechanism of crisis follows the 
same circular pattern in reverse. Revealing insolvency of the financial 
intermediaries, the falling prices forces the financial intermediaries to cease 
operations which consecutively leads to further cutback in prices. Krugman 
asserts that the cyclical-counter cyclical mechanism helps us in explaining the 
state of vulnerable Eastern Asian financial markets and the radical level of 
contagion between economies with few economic links. (Krugman 1998a) As a 
matter of fact, Burnside et al. (2001) provide several examples of publicly 
known bank failures and reorganizations that took place before the crisis, 
validating the existence of counter cyclical mechanisms.3  
Using a simplified 3-period framework, where assets are completely 
inelastic, that is, financial intermediaries can influence prices, not quantities; 
Krugman demonstrates the relationship between falling asset prices and failure 
of financial intermediaries. It is assumed that financial intermediaries are 
perceived to be fully insured and any expected economic profit is competed 
away. 4 The land can be purchased by the intermediaries, yielding rents of 25 or 
100 dollars with probabilities 2/3 and 1/3 at periods 2 and 3 respectively. Note 
that the expected return of the investment amounts to 100 at each period.  
 
                                                        
3
 Analyzing the stock markets of respective countries, the authors conclude that in Korea, 
Thailand and to a lesser extent, the Philippines and Malaysia, the value of the banking sectors 
had been declining well before the currency crises. It follows that private agents had sufficient 
information regarding the fragile nature of their banking systems.  
4
 Krugman (1998a) additionally assumes that the owners of intermediaries do not put any of 
their own capital at risk  
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Period 1   Period 2        Period 3 
      25 or 100        25 or 100  
It follows that, being fully insured at period 1, financial intermediaries will pay 
200 dollars (Panglos value) whereas the expected return amounts to a total of 
100 dollars in period 1. Next, he argues that, even if possibility of an exogenous 
regime change in period 2 is incorporated to the model, in other words if 
government may abandon the bailout regime with probability p in the second 
period, the financial intermediaries will still be willing to pay the Panglos value 
at period 1.  
Period 1    Period 2                  Period 3 
      25 or 100         25 or 100  
      P( regime change in Period 3) = p 
Needless to say, expected return is even lower in this scenario, even though the 
motives of financial intermediaries remain unchanged. Indeed, in a setting like 
this one, a regime change is inevitable as the financial intermediaries will 
constantly run losses, which in turn lower their credibility. Hence, regarding 
regime change as an endogenous phenomenon, Krugman constructs the final 
scenario as follows: creditors of financial intermediaries are bailed out precisely 
once. If the outcome turns out to be 25, not 100, in the second period, the first 
period expected rent will be 75. (50 in the third period + 25 in the second 
period) Consequently the total loss will be 125 rat
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magnification effect is caused by circular nature of disintermediation. 
Alternatively, even if the outcome in the second period is 100, creditors can be 
convinced that there will be no bailout in the third period. In other words, the 
creditors will provide funds which amounts to the expected return of 50, 
although the financial intermediaries still pay 100 (Panglos value) for the third 
period. This means that, the negative perceptions will be justified and a bailout 
will be required in the last period. On the basis of this moral hazard framework, 
Krugman aimed to explain the devastating effects of falling asset prices on the 
financial sector and self-fulfilling nature of negative expectations. (Krugman 
1998 a) 
Chang and Velasco (1998) claim that Krugman’s (1998 a) argument is 
incomplete as it neglects the fact that, at the aftermath of the currency crisis 
asset values drop below their “true” value. If illiquid banks and firms are forced 
to abandon and liquidate their investment projects before maturity, the value of 
the respective assets will be lower than it would have been in the absence of a 
crisis.  In the paper, they define presence of illiquid banks as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for financial crisis to occur. Their model suggest that, under 
fixed exchange rate regime a bank run turns into a currency run if the central 
bank acts as a lender of last resort. Jeanne and Zetelmeyer (2002) argue that 
within this context, a large international lender (i.e. International Monetary 
Fund) can help overcome the self-fulfilling crisis by lending to the government 
and conditioning the cash flow on net worth of the government which will be 
the real worth of the government under non-crisis conditions. The international 
institution can also guarantee foreign exchange deposits of “conditionally 
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solvent banks” (i.e. banks whose net worth is positive under non-crisis 
conditions). Through these mechanisms the international institution will loosen 
credit constraints of the domestic agents without acting like a lender of last 
resort.  
 
2.3. Balance Sheet Crisis Literature 
 
Balance sheet vulnerabilities of financial intermediaries, real sector and the 
government have become a central phenomenon of the later third generation 
literature. First class of models which focus on balance sheets of the banks 
involve currency mismatch accompanied with maturity mismatch. Namely, the 
crisis is characterized by runs on short term currency debts. The second class of 
models solely involve currency mismatch in corporate balance sheets where 
crisis involves credit crunch and fall in investment. In both cases, depreciation 
of the exchange rate is confirmed by the resulting real disruption, stemming 
either from bank or corporate balance sheets (Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2002)   
 
2.3.1. Currency Crisis, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance 
Sheet Vulnerabilities 
Throughout the remainder of the thesis, I will focus on the model of Eijffinger 
and Goderis (2007) in order to visualize the effect of corporate balance sheet 
position on probability of currency crisis through interest rate and exchange rate 
channels. 
The three-period model is characterized as follows. The monetary 
authority is committed to the fixed exchange rate regime in period t-1. At this 
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period the economy is assumed to be at long-run equilibrium. At period t, 
monetary authority can either maintain or abandon the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Throughout this period prices are sticky and the economy can deviate 
from its long-run equilibrium. At period t+1, monetary authority preserves the 
exchange-rate policy stance of the previous period. Market participants have 
perfect foresight of period t+1 price level and hence exchange rate (Purchasing 
power parity). That is to say, at period t+1 prices adjust and eventually the 
economy returns to long run equilibrium.5  
Mt - p t = γ – β(it – RPt)        Money market equilibrium                   (1) 
yt = yn – λ( rt –rn) + θ(St – p t)      Goods market equilibrium                   (2) 
rn = r* = i* = c         Natural level of real interest rate        (3) 
it = i* + (St+1 – St) + RPt          Uncovered interest rate parity                      (4) 
St+1 = pt+1            Purchasing Power Parity in period t+1       (5) 
it+1 = rt+1 + p& t+1                           Period t +1 Nominal interest rate =              (6) 
                                                       Real interest rate + Inflation   
 
r* is  foreign real exchange rate, i* is foreign nominal exchange rate, yt  is real 
domestic output, yn is natural level of real domestic output, rt is real domestic 
interest rate, rn is natural level of real domestic interest rate, it is nominal 
domestic interest rate, Mt is nominal domestic money supply, p t is fixed 
domestic price level, RPt is default risk premium (domestic – foreign), β is real 
                                                        
5
 All variables are in the form of natural logarithms. (*) is used for foreign country’s variables. 
See Appendix for a complete list of variables. 
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interest rate elasticity of money demand, λ is real interest rate elasticity of 
output, θ is real exchange rate elasticity of output, St is nominal exchange rate 
(home/foreign currency) at time t, fixSˆ is level of fixed exchange rate at period t-
1, p& t+1 is inflation at t+1 ( p& t+1 = pt+1 - pt), δ  is interest rate elasticity of 
investment. 
Risk premium is the indicator of financial fragility and derived from the 
corporate balance sheet. 
ln Risk Premium= ln 





t
t
NetWorth
Investment
 
Subtracting foreign risk premium from domestic risk premium leads to the 
definition of risk premium: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Φˆ t is the level of consolidated total assets at the beginning of period t (debt + 
net worth)
 
, 
d
tdˆ  is the level of consolidated domestic debt at the beginning of 
period t, ftdˆ is the level of consolidated foreign debt at the beginning of period t. 
It follows that a depreciated currency inflates the burden of foreign corporate 
debt, an increased real interest rate inflates the burden of domestic corporate 
debt and both of them contribute to a higher risk premium. Equation 1 suggests 
that demand for real money is dependent on return from domestic assets (it – 
RPt). As the goods market condition (equation 2) suggests, output is negatively 
affected from an increase in real interest rate as it reduce investment and hence 
aggregate demand. The latter term indicates the positive effect of real 
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depreciation on aggregate demand through the current account channel. 
Equation 3 depicts natural real interest rate which is equal to real foreign interest 
rate and nominal foreign interest rate as inflation in the foreign country is 
assumed to be zero. Equation 4 displays a revised version of uncovered interest 
rate parity where domestic and foreign assets are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes due to different levels of corporate default risks.   
Under fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy cannot be used to 
stimulate output since it has to maintain fixed exchange rate value. To illustrate 
this fact, let us assume that foreign interest rate rises which creates incentives 
for domestic agents to sell domestic assets, exchange receipts for foreign 
exchange and buy foreign assets. Under fixed exchange rate regime, the 
transaction will create depreciation pressures which should be countered by the 
monetary authority. Buying excess supply of domestic currency in exchange for 
foreign currency, the monetary authority reduces its foreign exchange reserves 
and money supply falls. Higher domestic interest rate re-establishes the 
equilibrium in equation 4 and fixed exchange rate is maintained.  
Finally the loss function of the monetary authority is as follows: 
( )22 1 kyypL nttCBt −−+= +&η
χ
 
where χ is the level of conservativeness of the monetary authority (the weight 
given to price stabilization) and η is the rate of time preference. One important 
assumption of the model is the wedge between desired and natural level of 
output. This difference, k, can be explained by political business cycles or an 
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imperfectly functioning labor market. In period t-1 and t+1 the output is at long 
run equilibrium level and the monetary authority can increase the output level 
above the natural level  ny  only in period t. In this setting, inflation can arise 
only when prices adjust, in period t+1.  
 
2.3.1.1. Solving the Model 
Under floating exchange rate, in long run equilibrium, it is assumed that market 
participants perfectly anticipate monetary policy. Having perfect foresight, they 
set the prices in such a way that output do not deviate from its natural level. 
Since the desired output level ( ny +k) is higher than the natural level of output, 
monetary authority has the incentive to use monetary policy in raising the output 
to the desired level. The market agents will anticipate this and increase their 
prices accordingly. The result is no output gain and a positive inflation. The 
inflationary bias which can be regarded as the natural level of inflation is 
computed using a 3-period discretionary framework. Under these conditions: 
Since market participants have perfect foresight: kXMM tt
η
χ+= −1        (8) 
Inflationary bias: npi  = kX ⋅






η
χ
     where      ( ) 




 +
+= β
βθλ 1X                    (9) 
Therefore the increase in money supply between period t-1 and t is translated 
into a price increase between period t+1 and t. Efficacy of monetary policy is 
established through both interest rate channel and exchange rate channel. Hence, 
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increases in the measures of λ andθ  (equation 2), respectively responsiveness 
of output to real interest deviations and divergence from Purchasing Power 
Parity, amplify the inflationary bias npi , whereas higher levels of β  reduces 
efficacy of monetary policy, causing lower impact of monetary policy on 
interest rates. Inflationary bias is negatively related with χ , which measures 
conservativeness value of the monetary authority. Higher conservativeness, by 
definition, means higher cost of inflation. A higher value of time preference (η ) 
gives rise to higher inflationary bias, as present cost of inflation decreases. The 
root cause of inflationary bias is k, which creates incentive for the monetary 
authority to increase output. It follows that a higher level of wedge between 
desired and natural output levels increases inflationary bias. 
Next, the authors examine the cases of (i) maintaining fixed exchange rate 
regime at period t and (ii) abandonment of fixed exchange rate regime at period 
t.   At period t, the domestic and foreign debt levels are allowed to change. For 
case (i): 
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For a given level of money supply, any type of debt results with increased risk 
premiums and a higher level of interest rate. (equation 4) Accordingly the output 
drops below its natural level and output cost of maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate increases. Since monetary policy cannot be used autonomously and fixed 
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exchange rate should be maintained, there will be no inflation, therefore no 
inflation cost. In case of abandonment (ii), loss function takes the following 
form: 
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The output cost part is quite similar to the previous case (i) where there is no 
inflation cost. If natural level of inflation is assumed to be zero, the inflation 
cost will disappear and loss functions of the two cases will be easily 
comparable. Since ( )))/(/)/( 2A+ηχηχ is less than 1, in case of zero natural 
level inflation, output cost of abandonment will be less than that of maintenance. 
Due to expansionary monetary policy, in the case of abandonment, a portion of 
the output loss will be compensated. 
Now that costs of abandonment and maintenance are derived, in line with the 
initial definition of currency crisis, one can compute the conditions under which 
abandonment of fixed exchange rate yield more benefits than maintenance.  
CB
tL (maintenance) > CBtL (abandonment) 
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Rearranging the terms: 
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2.3.1.2. Determination of Currency Crisis 
 
2.3.1.2.1. Domestic and Foreign Debt Levels 
Taking first order derivatives of Ω  with respect to 
t
d
td
Φˆ
ˆ
and 
t
f
td
Φˆ
ˆ
the authors 
capture effects of domestic and foreign debt on occurrence of currency crisis. 
0
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∂
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t
d
td
 condition indicates that regardless of other parameters the level of 
domestic debt increases the probability of a currency crisis. The reason is that a 
higher level of domestic debt increases risk premium which necessitates an 
increase in real money supply   In order to compensate for the increase in output 
cost, the monetary authority has the incentive to abandon the fixed exchange 
rate regime and pursue expansionary monetary policy. The other channel which 
reinforce monetary authority’s incentive to abandon the fixed exchange rate 
regime, stem from corporate sector’s sensitivity to changes in interest rate. That 
is to say, due to higher level of domestic debt, a decrease in interest rate has a 
high negative impact on risk premium. As both forces operate in the same 
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direction, their combined effect exceeds the cost of inflation in case of 
abandonment. 
Taking first order derivative of Ω  with respect to 
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depending on the parameter values. Similar to the case of domestic debt, a 
higher level of foreign currency denominated debt results with a higher level of 
risk premium, creating incentives for the monetary authority to abandon fixed 
exchange rate regime. However, in the case of foreign debt, loosening of 
monetary policy decreases effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating 
output as this action leads to depreciation of the currency. Since foreign 
currency denominated debt is at a relatively high level, currency depreciation 
will have adverse effects in terms of net worth of the corporation. Taking these 
two effects in consideration, the overall impact of monetary policy depends on 
the parameter values. To put it differently, higher level of foreign debt increases 
the need for output loss compensation, however, lowers the efficacy of monetary 
policy. 
Next the authors examine the impact of other model variables on the 
probability of currency crisis. Similar to the previous analysis, the effect of these 
variables arise from two channels: inflation and output costs. Although 
realizations of respective costs are dependent on the type of the exchange rate 
regime, they still influence the exchange rate decision of the monetary authority 
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at time t. The parameters that are examined are χ (conservativeness degree of the 
monetary authority), η (time preference rate of the monetary authority), k 
(positive wedge between output level targeted by the monetary authority and 
natural level of output), θ (real exchange rate elasticity of output), λ (real 
interest rate elasticity of output), β (nominal interest rate elasticity of money 
demand) and rn (natural domestic interest rate) 
 
2.3.1.2.2. Conservativeness Degree of the Monetary Authority (χ) 
An increase in the conservativeness degree of the monetary authority can either 
increase or decrease the probability of currency crisis. Since  Ω  is obtained by 
subtracting the loss function of the maintenance case from the loss function of 
the abandonment case, one can examine the two channels separately. In the case 
of maintenance, conservativeness degree of the monetary authority plays no 
roles, since the economy incurs no inflation costs in that setting. However, 
abandonment gives rise to both output cost and inflation cost. For the output 
cost, an increase in the conservativeness degree of the monetary authority poses 
a negative effect. Since inflation which arises from the loosening monetary 
policy is given more weight in the loss function, the monetary authority has less 
incentive to induce output and therefore in the case of abandonment, output cost 
increases. 
As the weight of inflation in the loss function increases, monetary 
authority seeks to create less inflation. Furthermore, given that the monetary 
authority follows a more strict monetary policy the decrease in output drives 
down the inflation as well. Consequently, these two effects more than offset the 
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initial increase in conservativeness degree of the monetary authority and the 
overall impact on inflation cost is negative. In brief, with a positive impact on 
output cost and a negative effect on inflation cost, conservativeness degree of 
the monetary authority can either increase or decrease the probability of 
currency crisis. 
 The effect of the changes in the remaining model parameters on the 
probability of a currency crisis can be examined in a similar fashion, through 
investigating inflation and output cost channels separately. The analysis is 
depicted in Appendix B.  
 
2.4. Other Studies 
From  a conventional perspective, a higher interest rate can be regarded as a 
handy defensive tool against speculative attacks, as it obstructs taking short 
positions on domestic currency and signals monetary authority’s commitment to 
the fixed exchange rate regime.   Nonetheless, the theoretical connection 
between corporate balance sheet structure and occurrence of currency crisis 
instigated several empirical studies over the last years. Kraay (2002) reports lack 
systematic association between interest rates and outcome of speculative attacks 
both in developed and developing countries. Modifying Kraay’s framework, 
Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) incorporate other country specific fundamentals, 
namely short-term and long-term corporate debt, in order to investigate the 
theoretical linkages. The authors find out that the interest rate defense is not a 
credible policy if the level of short-term corporate debt is high. In a different 
study, Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) additionally suggest that raising interest 
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rates is more credible and hence effective in countries with high-quality 
institutions.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
2001 CURRENCY CRISIS IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Characterization of the Crisis 
Unlike the case of East Asian crisis (1997), the Turkish crisis (2001) cannot be 
instantly regarded as being of a third-generation nature as some factors, such as 
the high government deficits (Table 1) seem to point out the possibility of a first 
and second generation crisis. Nonetheless, in order to establish such a 
connection between the occurrence of the currency crisis and government 
deficits, monetization of deficits by the central bank is a necessary condition. 
Table 1: Financing of Consolidated Budget Deficits (% GNP) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement 
5 8.6 7.7 9.4 15.6 12.5 15.9 
Consolidated Budget 
Borrowing Requirement 
3.7 8.5 7.6 7.1 11.6 10.2 17.9 
Net Domestic Borrowing 3.6 7.1 8.5 8.6 12.4 7.4 12.9 
Net Foreign Borrowing -1 -0.9 -1.5 -1.9 0.6 2.1 -2.5 
Central Bank Advances 1.2 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Deferred Payments 0 0.7 0.6 0.5 -1.4 0.6 7.4 
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury 
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Apparently the Turkish economy has already undergone reforms to prohibit 
financing of the fiscal deficits by the Central Bank by the time the crisis 
surfaced in 2001. Note that in the years following the adoption of pre-announced 
crawling peg exchange rate policy (December 1999) which is supported by the 
IMF, the central bank reserve levels remain high except for the aftermath of the 
crisis. Although pre-announcement of the timing and magnitude of exchange 
rate band decisions were deemed to be the strength of the program, the policy 
arguably influenced the timing of the attack. According to the program it was 
publicly announced that the transition period would be over and Turkish Lira 
would be allowed to float in June 2001, that is 4 months after occurrence of the 
crisis. 
Table 2: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Balance Sheet 
Time 
Net Domestic 
Assets * 
Net Foreign 
Assets * 
Base 
money * Reserves** 
1995 323 -6 317 12,391 
1996 335 275 610 16,273 
1997 142 988 1,13 18,419 
Jun-98 -1,778 3,331 1,553 26,377 
1998 625 1,486 2,111 19,721 
Jun-99 -899 3,526 2,627 21,521 
1999 -938 4,818 3,88 23,177 
Jun-00 -1,741 6,372 4,631 24,547 
2000 2,485 3,303 5,788 22,172 
2001 20,475 -12,672 7,803 18,787 
* Trillions of TL 
** Millions of USD 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Electronic data delivery system 
 
The two observations overrule the possibility of a first-generation-like currency 
crisis. Despite the persistently declining inflation levels Yilmazkuday (2008) 
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claims that extensions of first generation models have some limited explanatory 
power in clarifying the causes of the crisis. The author asserts that in accordance 
with Calvo’s (1996) claims if the government finances the fiscal deficit not by 
seigniorage but by borrowing, the economy will experience the same level of 
inflation yet at an earlier date. 
Table 3: Consumer Inflation 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Avarage 89 80.2 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 
End-year 76 79.8 99.1 69.7 68.8 39 68.5 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Electronic data delivery system 
 
Due to the ongoing disinflationary IMF program substantial success was 
achieved at the inflation front by the end of year 2000, which contradicts with 
the previous claim. There exists more evidence to support the explanatory power 
of the second-generation models as compared to the case of first-generation 
frameworks.   
Table 4: Growth and Unemployment 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) 
7 7 7 8 6 8 10 10 
GDP  growth (annual %) 7 8 2 -3 7 -6 6 5 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
 
Prior to the crisis in 2001 unemployment rate was not an important concern for 
the policy makers as the fairly stable trend suggests. In other words, prior to the 
crisis the economy did not encounter a second-generation type policy trade off 
problem. However, Ozatay (2003) claims that the high levels of short-term 
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public debt might trigger a self-fulfilling attack if the speculators anticipate the 
weakness of the financial sector and believe that the government will not 
consider increasing the interest rate under such fragile circumstances. I believe 
that the weakness of the financial sector should be examined within the context 
of third generation models, since it brings about problems such as maturity 
mismatches which will be examined later. Another important point which can be 
drawn from Table 4 is the high growth rates following the crisis year. Ozatay 
(2003) defines the subsequent high growth rates as an implication of second-
generation type crisis since the third-generation type crisis typically causes low 
growth rates due to the difficult recovery of corporate or financial sectors. 
However, the sound post-crisis growth performance can easily be attributed to 
the “baseline effect” and does not imply the type of the crisis per se.   
Table 5: Inflation and Nominal Interest Rate 
  Inflation * Nominal Interest Rate ** 
Jun-99 64.3 77.13 
Jul-99 65 76.9 
Aug-99 65.4 77.18 
Sep-99 64.3 71.94 
Oct-99 64.7 71.03 
Nov-99 64.6 70.45 
Dec-99 68.8 72.11 
Jan-00 68.9 41.85 
Feb-00 69.7 41.54 
Mar-00 67.9 38.47 
Apr-00 63.8 38.85 
May-00 62.7 38.82 
Jun-00 58.6 43.51 
Jul-00 56.2 36.08 
Aug-00 53.2 30.71 
Sep-00 49 42.53 
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Oct-00 44.4 41.49 
Nov-00 43.8 48.91 
Dec-00 39 81.2 
Jan-01 35.9 51.54 
Feb-01 33.4 344.1 
Mar-01 37.5 124.44 
Apr-01 48.3 90.23 
May-01 52.4 69.91 
* Price change as compared to the same month of the previous year 
** 1 month deposit rate 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Electronic data delivery system 
 
Considering that the wedge between nominal interest rate and inflation has been, 
on the whole, decreasing over the past year, it might be difficult to explain the 
occurrence of the crisis through the upsetting effects of real interest rates on 
corporate and financial balance sheets in the short run. However the crisis and 
the associated interest rate hike in December 2000 hits the state banks hard in 
particular. 
 
3.2. Comparing Turkish Crisis and East Asian Crisis 
Since Thailand economy was the first and arguably most affected East Asian 
economy, it is chosen as a benchmark for the comparison between Turkish and 
East Asian currency crisis.  Similar to the Turkish case, there is no apparent 
decline in reserves or foreign assets prior to the crisis, whereas the data of the 
crisis years clearly indicate sizable interventions in the foreign exchange market.    
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Table 6: Bank of Thailand Balance Sheet 
Time 
Net 
Domestic 
Assets* 
Net 
Foreign 
Assets* 
Base 
Money * Reserves** 
1994 111984 758797 24544 30279 
1995 140928 931644 25369 37027 
1996 222325 990654 24917 38725 
1997 1337002 935904 56500 26968 
1998 1728162 672313 40426 29536 
1999 1689475 822851 36568 34781 
2000 1730274 875580 31504 32661 
2001 1482093 1039637 30907 33048 
 
* Millions of Baht 
** Millions of USD 
Source: Bank of Thailand Statistics and Own Calculations 
  
Table 7: Financing of Budget Deficits in Thailand (% GDP)   
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Loans to Central 
Government 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 
Net Domestic Borrowing 0.25 0.16 0.52 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 
Net Foreign Borrowing -0.03 0.06 0.28 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand Statistics 
 
 
 Contrary to Turkey’s case central bank can lend to central government 
which indicates the possibility of first and second generation type crisis. 
Nonetheless, the ratio of loans to Gross Domestic Product is relatively 
insignificant as compared to Turkey’s ratios before the crisis. In general, a first 
and second generation type crisis seems to be highly improbable in Thailand, 
because of additional macroeconomic reasons.  
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Table 8: Inflation and Nominal Interest Rate in Thailand 
  Inflation * 
Nominal Interest 
Rate ** 
Jan-96 7.2 12.0 
Feb-96 7.4 11.0 
Mar-96 7.3 11.0 
Apr-96 7.1 11.0 
May-96 6.1 10.0 
Jun-96 5.5 10.0 
Jul-96 5.4 10.0 
Aug-96 5.7 10.0 
Sep-96 4.6 10.0 
Oct-96 4.3 10.0 
Nov-96 4.7 10.0 
Dec-96 4.7 9.0 
Jan-97 4.4 9.8 
Feb-97 4.4 9.8 
Mar-97 4.7 9.8 
Apr-97 4.2 9.5 
May-97 4.2 9.3 
Jun-97 4.5 9.3 
Jul-97 4.9 11.5 
Aug-97 6.6 11.5 
Sep-97 6.9 11.5 
Oct-97 7.3 11.5 
Nov-97 7.7 11.5 
Dec-97 7.7 11.5 
Jan-98 8.6 11.5 
Feb-98 8.8 12.3 
Mar-98 9.3 12.3 
Apr-98 10.0 12.3 
May-98 10.3 12.3 
Jun-98 10.6 12.0 
Jul-98 10.0 14.0 
Aug-98 7.5 12.0 
Sep-98 6.8 8.8 
Oct-98 5.8 7.8 
Nov-98 4.6 6.8 
Dec-98 4.3 6.0 
* Price change as compared to the same month of the previous year 
** Deposit rate 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
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Contrary to the case of Turkey, the constantly rising inflation level before 1997 
might be an indicator of substantial government borrowing in line with Calvo’s 
(1996) arguments. More importantly the increasing real interest rates might have 
adverse implications for corporate balance sheets which increases the possibility 
of a third generation type crisis. Although the increasing trend of the real 
interest rate was less apparent in Turkey, it had similar undesirable implications 
prior to both crisis episodes. 
Table 9: Growth and Unemployment in Thailand 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 3.4 3 2.4 2.6 
GDP growth (annual %) 9 9.2 5.9 -1.4 -10.5 4.5 4.8 2.2 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
As it is discussed before, relatively low levels of unemployment and impressive 
growth rates overrule the possibility that of a first or second generation type 
crisis. However in the case of Turkey it is difficult to eliminate the possibility of 
a first or second generation type crisis, by simply checking the macroeconomic 
conditions.  
In general, there appears to be a consensus over the fact that the problem 
largely stems from the balance sheets of the financial sector and financial 
weaknesses specific to the Turkish economy, rather than the corporate balance 
sheet structure. On the other hand, Allen et al. (2002) argues that currency 
mismatch problem was apparent both in the financial and real sectors. As for the 
maturity mismatch, the authors point out that the corporate balance sheet data do 
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not enable a reliable analysis, while maturity mismatch in the financial sector is 
one of the prime causes of the crisis. 
3.3. Financial Crisis 
To begin with, the financial crisis cannot be attributed to a liquidity problem or a 
rapid credit expansion since the situation in non-crisis times does not vary 
significantly as compared to the time of the crisis. That is to say the increasing 
risk of the banks cannot be captured through these measures. However the level 
of non-performing loans has been increasing the possibility of a crisis ever since 
1997. This trend is primarily due to the actions of Saving Deposit Insurance 
Fund who took increasing numbers of banks under its control and could not 
convince the market that the trend in the loan performance is of a temporary 
nature. Over the active engagement period of Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 
the perceived financial risks climbed at each subsequent year, deteriorating the 
borrowing capabilities of the institutions. Note that, the effect of 
miscommunication was devastating as the economy was just recovering from a 
long history of high inflation after 1999, which already affected the long-run 
borrowing capabilities of the financial sector negatively. The maturity mismatch 
problem reached to an extent that, as reported by Ozatay (2003), “for one unit of 
three-month liability, there was a 0.5 unit of three-month asset at the end of 
1999”. 
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Table 10: Liquidity, Credit Growth, Non-Performing Loans 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
M1YRS / Central Bank Reserves 1.85 1.76 1.81 1.75 1.49 2.22 1.78 
M2YR/ Central Bank Reserves 3.57 3.48 3.39 3.64 3.53 4.16 3.98 
Real Credit Growth 18.6 24.6 7.7 -14.7 -13.6 17.4 -28.2 
Non-Performing / Total Loans 2.8 2.2 2.4 7.2 10.7 11.6 18.6 
 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Electronic data delivery system 
 
Public and private banks played different roles in realization of the crisis due to 
their different portfolio structures.   After 1992 state banks have been used to 
finance growing expansionary needs of the Treasury and the state banks 
incurred substantial duty losses as these loans are characterized as “performing 
loans”. The problem naturally arises because of the fact that in addition to its 
supervisory role in the financial market the Treasury was controlling the 
financial state enterprises. The losses needed to be financed by short term 
domestic liabilities which are sensitive to the increases in the interest rates.    
Table 11: Duty Losses of the State Banks 
 (% GNP) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Duty Losses of the State Banks 1.85 1.76 1.81 1.75 1.49 2.22 1.78 
 
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury 
 
Due to the comparatively higher portion of domestic liabilities of the state 
banks, the interest rate hike in December 2000 hit the state banks more severely 
while at the aftermath of the 2001 crisis it was the private financial institutions 
who suffered the most. By the time the 1999 IMF stabilization program was in 
place, the government debt instruments constituted a larger portion of the 
private bank balance sheets compared to government debt instruments portfolio. 
Therefore the burden of government debt sustainability created additional 
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problems in terms of increased risk in the financial sector. Note that the 
relationship between the government and the financial institutions takes a rather 
different and direct form as compared to the East Asia crisis. In the case of East 
Asian crisis, it was perceptions of implicit government guarantees which led to 
over lending, while in the case of Turkey it is the observable remnants of an era 
where the state had direct control over the financial sector in terms of direct 
control and supervision.    
The substantial financial risk which is accumulated through short-term financing 
of government bonds finally came to a halt when the primary dealer of 
government bonds, Demirbank could not sustain the debt rollover scheme in 
December 2001. Being a primary dealer, in exchange for the privilege of having 
a priority in government bond auctions, Demirbank had to purchase 15% of the 
transaction volume from the government. The primary dealer role gave rise to a 
higher level of government bonds, hence higher level of domestic assets, in the 
balance sheet, compared to other private financial institution.  
Table 12: Relative Risk Scheme of Demirbank 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Government Instruments / Total 
Assets 
Sector 31.72 29.5 34.64 31.45 21.52 
Demirbank 58.54 57.09 65.12 58.33 67.63 
 
Interest Earning Assets / Total 
Assets 
Sector 67.8 63.66 63.22 60.79 52.73 
Demirbank 77.44 72.86 79.57 73.57 84.6 
 
Long term / Total Government 
Instruments 
Sector 9.95 8.37 18.43 20.3 69.26 
  Demirbank 23.49 27.15 27.15 28.83 27.43 
 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
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Demirbank’s short-term dependency on the other banks in terms of overnight 
borrowing caused the crisis to crystallize and propagate easily.  Reluctance of 
the sector in lending to Demirbank, forced Demirbank to borrow from abroad 
through structured loan agreements by offering government instruments as 
collateral. The payment failure resulted with automatic sale of government 
instruments, consequently a huge decline in government bond prices to which 
the banking system is dependent and finally an increased demand for foreign 
currency. Hence the failure of the riskiest bank quickly propagated to the whole 
sector and triggered a currency crisis.  
Önder and Özyıldırım (2008) point out additional systemic weaknesses 
in the financial sector prior to 2001. Evidently moral hazard undermined the 
banking system and contrary to the widely accepted perceptions (Demirguc-
Kunt, A., and Huizinga, H. (2004)), depositor activity increased in the presence 
of implicit government guarantees. More importantly, controlling for bank 
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and yearly effects, both depositors 
and borrowers reacted negatively to risky banks and punished risky institutions 
during the periods of generous government guarantees. However this corrective 
behavioral pattern failed to alleviate risky activities of financial institutions. The 
authors demonstrate that the activities that involve moral hazard intensified even 
after introduction of 100% deposit insurance. In a nutshell, third generation type 
moral hazard problem was apparent in 2001, together with the structural 
weaknesses that are described above. Furthermore, the actions of the market 
participants did not influence the activities of the banking system in a corrective 
fashion.    
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Even though the crisis is widely regarded as being a financial one, the root cause 
turns out to be the ever increasing government deficits and the mechanism of 
fiscal financing. Nonetheless, as the other alternatives are proven to be 
inadequate in explaining the phenomenon, it can safely be labeled as a third-
generation type crisis which is to a great extent triggered by special local 
weaknesses in the fiscal deficit financing mechanism.  Note that due to the 
nature of this mechanism, by the means of declining government instrument 
prices, the financial crisis feed the government debt sustainability problem and 
consequently the extent of the initial crisis is magnified. The root cause of the 
crisis can also be traced back to the ambiguous selection criterion and executive 
decisions of the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund. Among other conclusions, the 
Turkish crisis highlights the importance of transparency and accountability in 
every level of financial intermediation.  
 
3.4. EIJFFINGER AND GODERIS (2007) MODEL AND THE 
TURKISH CRISIS 
According to Eijfinger and Goderis’s (2007) specification a currency crisis 
materializes if the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange regime exceeds the cost 
of abandonment.  Although, technically Central Bank of Republic of Turkey 
was not committed to a fixed exchange rate regime, its exchange rate policy 
decisions were determined by the publicly known, pre-announced IMF program 
which necessitates central bank’s intervention in the exchange rate regime 
market whenever nominal exchange rate moves out of the pre-announced policy 
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band. Therefore the policy setting of the pre-crisis period satisfies the first 
assumption of the Eijfinger and Goderis (2007)  model.  
The most notable feature of the Eijfinger and Goderis (2007) model is 
the risk premium term that is used in the money market equilibrium and 
uncovered interest parity condition equations. The relative risk premium term is 
derived from the corporate risk premiums of domestic and foreign economies, 
which is basically the ratio of investment to net worth. In the case of Turkish 
crisis, the increased risk premium stems from the maturity mismatch in the 
financial sector’s balance sheets rather. This particular characteristic is not 
captured by the Eijfinger and Goderis (2007) model, since the model 
investigates corporate sector balance sheets and does not address maturity 
mismatch issues. Other studies such as Corsetti (1999) focuses on moral hazard 
and implicit government guarantees appears to be more relevant to the 
institutional characteristics of Turkey, throughout the crisis epoch. However, 
although third generation features such as implicit government guarantees, 
resulting moral hazard and overinvestment in the financial sector are present in 
the Turkish crisis, other unique weaknesses played important roles which are 
described in the previous sections. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to exhibit the evolution of “third-generation” responses 
to the previous episodes of currency crisis. Although third generation literature 
exhibit some recurrent features, each model brings about a fresh perspective and 
different assumptions. At the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the early 
theories were centered on a possible moral-hazard and overinvestment channel, 
whereas balance sheet crisis literature has focused on feedback mechanisms 
between the real economy and corporate and banking sector balance sheets. 
While establishing this link, the later strand of third generation models operate 
under different assumptions and do not identify the overinvestment channel as a 
root cause of currency crisis. 6 In fact, all of these distinct approaches contribute 
to our understanding of currency crisis, particularly the East Asian (1997) 
episode.  
                                                        
6
 For instance in Eijffinger and Goderis (2007) investment is defined in a conventional sense ( 
ln(Investment t)= ψ-δ(rt-rn) ) where it is a function of differences between domestic real interest 
rate and natural level of real interest rate.    
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The balance sheet crisis literature is still evolving and instigating wide range of 
new ideas some of which have already been proven to be reliable, thanks to the 
empirical analysis. Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) point out to an important 
endogeneity problem concerning the ratio of short term debt to total assets. 
According to this critical approach, it may not be the case that short term debt 
affects the outcome of an attack. Rather the probability of a successful attack 
can determine the short-term debt of the corporation. This alternative channel 
can form the basis of future research both in empirical and theoretical front. 
Finally, the examination of the 2001 Turkish crisis clarifies the possible 
connections between fiscal debt sustainability, financial health and probability 
of a currency crisis. Although the crisis exhibit distinct characteristics which 
was not present in the East Asian crisis, the underlying reasons for the 2001 
Turkish crisis are largely in line with the arguments of the third-generation 
currency crisis literature.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
INSTANCES OF FRAUD IN EAST ASIA 
 
 
Source: The Sixth and Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Thailand 1920 2335 2233 6468 6461 6831 
Republic of Korea 140365 199684 171412 209009 221828 174767 
Hong Kong 2270 1982 1631 1829 2042 2040 
Malaysia 270 430 568 34 48 78 
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APPENDIX B 
OTHER VARIABLES 
  
 
Time preference rate of the monetary authority (η) 
A higher time preference rate of the monetary authority is equivalent to a 
decrease in the conservativeness degree. Namely, as the parameter value 
increases inflation in period t is valued less. Therefore, in case of abandonment, 
output cost increases, inflation cost decreases and the overall effect is yet again 
parameter dependent.   
The wedge between output level targeted by the monetary authority and 
natural level of output (k) 
For any actual output level, an increase in the targeted level increases the output 
cost, creating incentives for abandonment of fixed exchange rate regime. As in 
the other cases, inflation cost is realized only in the case of abandonment, 
offsetting a fraction of the increased output cost. Since the monetary authority is 
more inclined to abandon fixed exchange rate regime in order to reach higher 
levels of output, inflation cost raise accordingly. The inflation cost raises the 
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probability of maintenance and the overall effect will be either an increase or 
decrease in the currency crisis probability 
Real exchange rate elasticity of output (θ) 
In case of abandonment, an increase in the parameter will create an incentive for 
loosening monetary policy since the resulting depreciation effect will stimulate 
output through current account channel more effectively. Once again, in case of 
abandonment the accompanying inflation cost creates incentive for maintenance. 
Having reduced output cost on one hand and positive inflation cost on the other, 
an increase in real exchange rate elasticity of output can either increase or 
decrease the probability of a currency crisis.   
Real interest rate elasticity of output (λ) 
Higher values of real interest rate elasticity of output imply higher depression of 
investment and output, necessitating higher output loss compensation. Another 
factor which influences abandonment is the possibility of more effective output 
stimulation through the exchange rate channel. On the other hand, as monetary 
authority becomes more inclined to loosen monetary stance, an inflationary bias 
emerges and creates incentive for maintenance. Therefore, the net effect of an 
increase in real interest rate elasticity of output is either a decreased or increased 
probability of currency crisis. 
Nominal interest rate elasticity of money demand (β) 
If nominal interest rate elasticity of money demand increases, for a given level 
of monetary expansion, nominal interest rate falls by a slighter amount. In that 
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case, the resulting output gain is more limited which points out to lower efficacy 
of monetary policy in stimulating output. Hence output cost is higher and 
monetary authority has more incentives to maintain fixed exchange rate regime. 
Another effect of lower monetary policy efficacy is a lower inflationary bias, 
that is, lower inflation cost and increased tendency to abandon fixed exchange 
rate regime. With lower inflation cost and higher output cost, probability of 
currency crisis either decreases or increases. 
Natural domestic interest rate (rn) 
Finally, an increase in the level of rn , which is equivalent to foreign real interest 
rate, increases the probability of currency crisis. As inflation rate in the foreign 
country is assumed to be zero at all times, an increase in rn is also equivalent to 
an increase in nominal interest rates
 
of the foreign country. The increase is 
translated to an increase in the risk premium and lower output which 
necessitates monetary compensation. Since the only way to balance the reduced 
output is raising the real money supply, an increase in rn leads to higher 
probability of abandonment and currency crisis. Through an increase in rn the 
economy incurs both inflation and output costs as it is already mentioned.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
SAVING DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND 
 (TRANSFERRED BANKS) 
 
Banks Date of Transfer to Current Status  
  Saving Deposit Insuarance Fund   
Egebank  Dec 21,1999 It was merged with 
Sümerbank on January 26, 
2001. 
Yurtbank Dec 21,1999 It was merged with 
Sümerbank on January 26, 
2001. 
Yaşarbank Dec 21,1999 It was merged with 
Sümerbank on January 26, 
2001. 
Bank 
Kapital 
27-Oct-00 It was merged with 
Sümerbank on January 26, 
2001. 
Ulusalbank 28-Feb-01 It was merged with 
Sümerbank on April 17, 
2001. 
Interbank 7-Jan-99 It was merged with Etibank 
on June 15, 2001. 
Esbank 21-Dec-99 It was merged with Etibank 
on June 15, 2001. 
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Iktisat  
Bankası 
15-
Mar-
01 
Its banking license was revoked as of December 7, 2001 
and the liquidation process was initiated. Upon the 
resolution adopted in the General Assembly Meeting on 
April 4, 2002 the liquidation decision was revoked and the 
Bank was merged under Bayindirbank. 
Kentbank 9-Jul-
01 
Its banking license was revoked as of December 28, 2001 
and the liquidation process was initiated. Upon the 
resolution adopted in the General Assembly Meeting on 
April 4, 2002 the liquidation decision was revoked and the 
Bank was merged under Bayindirbank 
Etibank 27-
Oct-
00 
Its banking license was revoked as of December 28, 2001 
and the liquidation process was initiated. Upon the 
resolution adopted in the General Assembly Meeting on 
April 4, 2002 the liquidation decision was revoked and the 
Bank was merged under Bayindirbank 
EGSBank  9-Jul-
01 
Its banking license was revoked as of January 18, 2002 
and merged with Bayindirbank as of the same date. 
Toprakbank 30-
Nov-
01 
Its banking license was revoked as of September 30, 2002 
and merged with Bayindirbank on the same date. 
Source: Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 
 
